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Let’s Have Soufflé Instead: Selective Reform of the
Investor-State Dispute Settlement Regime
Esther-Jane Grenness1
Abstract
A network of agreements comprising the investment treaty law
regime cover international investments. It is a system rife with abuses
made possible by loopholes and an inconsistent body of law. The system is in a legitimacy crisis and many seek to dismantle it entirely.
Numerous alternatives and improvements have been proffered but few
impactful steps have been taken to mitigate the problems within it. This
comment advocates for an incremental approach that keeps the parts
of the system that work while removing aspects that enable the most
egregious abuses.
ACRONYMS
ADR
BIT
FET
FTA
ICS
ICSID
IIA
ISA
ISDS
MFN
OECD
TPP
UNCITRAL
UNCTAD

1.

Alternative dispute resolution
Bilateral investment treaty
Fair and equitable treatment
Free trade agreement
Investment court system
International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes
International investment agreement
Investor-State arbitration
Investor-State dispute settlement
Most favored nation
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
Trans-Pacific Partnership
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development

Esther-Jane Grenness is a J.D. candidate at the University of Baltimore School of Law
in Baltimore, Maryland. She may be reached at esther.grenness@gmail.com.

138

_GRENNESS_FORMATTED 10-26 (DO NOT DELETE)

10/26/2018 11:44 AM

ILS Journal of International Law

Vol. VI, No. 1

Introduction
There is a problem child in international law, and its name is investment treaty law. It benefits only foreign investors and allows them
to haul sovereign States before three-member arbitral tribunals. The
arbitrators determine whether States must shell out public funds, and
the decisions may not be appealed. These three arbitrators are not State
appointed officials. Indeed, they are not even judges or political appointees. Rather, the arbitrators are private individuals who can tell
sovereign States what to do. Known as investor-State arbitration, it is
a tool where investors’ private interests sometimes overcome sovereign States’ public interests, and investor-State dispute settlement
(ISDS) is the mechanism that allows it.
Because domestic courts were considered biased toward foreigners, ISDS was created so that wronged foreign investors could have a
neutral forum in which to seek redress against States hosting their investment.2 ISDS was created in 1966 with the advent of the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID),
which is a subsidiary organization of the World Bank. Because investing money is a private affair, ISDS was modeled on the dispute resolution mechanism frequently utilized in disputes between parties in international commercial law, which is arbitration.3 Unlike arbitration in
the domestic sphere, which is generally cheaper than litigation and
concluded quickly, investor-State arbitration is an arduous and appallingly expensive procedure.4
Cases where foreign investors received payouts from States via
ISDS were once rare, but they are not rare anymore, and the number

2.
3.
4.

See infra Section III.A.
Jack J. Coe, Jr., Transparency in the Resolution of Investor-State Disputes—Adoption,
Adaptation, and NAFTA Leadership, 54 U. KAN. L. REV. 1339, 1340 (2006).
Pia Eberhardt & Cecilia Olivet, Profiting from Injustice: How Law Firms, Arbitrators
and Financiers are Fueling an Investment Arbitration Boom, CORPORATE EUR.
OBSERVATORY & THE TRANSNATIONAL INST. 1, 14-16 (2012). As an illustration regarding the costs of investor-State arbitration, consider that ICSID arbitrators are compensated at $3,000 per day, and there are three arbitrators to a panel. The costs for the arbitrators does not include any other costs such as the parties’ own counsel, institutional
costs, administrative costs, etc. Arbitrators in investor-State arbitration cases receive an
average of $200,000 per case. Joost Pauwelyn, The Rule of Law without the Rule of
Lawyers? Why Investment Arbitrators are from Mars, Trade Adjudicators from Venus,
109 AM. J. INT’L L. 761, 791 (2015).
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of cases exploded over the last ten years.5 ISDS is a system riddled
with opportunities for abuse because there are thousands of treaties that
allow for it,6 and most of those treaties have vague language that’s ripe
for expansive interpretation.7 It is a system where inconsistency
abounds, and the rationale behind divergent decisions sometimes cannot be explained.8 The system desperately needs reform to end abuses
and bring consistency. As the number of cases rises, the amount of
taxpayer money shed to defend and pay claims skyrockets. Not surprisingly, taxpayer ire and public interest group concern does the
same—ISDS is a dirty word in many circles.9
“[T]here is widespread consensus . . . something is not quite right
with the investor-State arbitration mechanism,”10 and virtually all
stakeholders agree at least some change is necessary.11 Instead, the disagreement lies in “the what, how and extent of such reform.”12 The
ISDS regime is at a critical stage and could wind up collapsing under
its own weight. Practitioners within the ISDS regime should not “underestimate the disenchantment” of the taxpaying public or “ignore the
power of human ingenuity” to dismantle the distasteful.13 There is an
opportunity to improve the rule of law in the international sphere, and
“[t]he objective of any reform should be to bring certainty to the rules
of investment protection and improve legitimacy.”14
There are many different proposals to reform the system, and each
proposal has sub-elements. Some proposals are more feasible than
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

12.
13.

14.

See infra Section II.B.
See infra Section III.B.
See infra Part II.
See infra Section III.B.
See, e.g., Eberhardt & Olivet, supra note 4.
Luis González García, Making Impossible Investor-State Reform Possible, in 4
RESHAPING THE INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM 424, 424-25 (Jean E.
Kalicki & Anna Joubin-Bret eds., 2015).
David Gaukrodger & Kathryn Gordon, Inter-Governmental Evaluation of InvestorState Dispute Settlement: Recent Work at the OECD-Hosted Freedom of Investment
Roundtable, in 4 RESHAPING THE INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM 597,
599 (Jean E. Kalicki & Anna Joubin-Bret eds., 2015).
U.N. CONF. ON TRADE & DEV., WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2015, 120 (2015) [Hereinafter WIR15].
Locknie Hsu, Examining the Formative Aspect of Investment Treaty Commitments:
Lessons from Commercial Law and Trade Law, in 4 RESHAPING THE INVESTOR-STATE
DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM 221, 221 & n.2 (Jean E. Kalicki & Anna Joubin-Bret eds.,
2015) (quoting comments from the Chief Justice of Singapore).
González García, supra note 10, at 433.
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others, but no one proposal can solve the problem. The solution lies in
taking a little bit from each proposal and combining it into a coherent,
coordinated approach. The reform options are a bit like a recipe, and
only the finest ingredients belong in a quality recipe. Because States
are not very keen on change, a judicious approach where only the foulest parts of the system are removed is the most sensible. For States to
get on board with reform, they must see that it “is essential in the interest of the rule of law[,]” the benefits must outweigh “any possible
adverse effect,” and “reform will not greatly affect the status quo.”15
Accordingly, this comment advocates for a selective approach to
shaping the overall system. Part II provides an overview of the ISDS
landscape; its sources of law along with what it is and how it functions.16 Part III gives context with background and history that will inform the reader of the extent of the decay and which elements are most
rotten.17 Finally, Part IV delves into the selective approach proffered
in this comment. Part IV is divided into three sub-sections: (1) substantive reform, (2) institutional/procedural reform, and (3) normative
reform.18
In the Kitchen: ISDS Regime
Ingredient Origin: Sources of Law
International investment law is comprised of a “patchwork of
agreements” that is as convoluted as it is voluminous.19 Indeed, it is
often referred to as a “complex spaghetti bowl.”20 As of 2017, there
were 3,324 international investment agreements (IIAs).21 Most of these
are bilateral investment treaties (BITs) but some are free trade agreements (FTAs) with investment chapters.22 The majority of these
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

Id. at 425.
See infra Part II.
See infra Part III.
See infra Part IV.
Silvia Constain, ISDS Growing Pains and Responsible Adulthood, in 4 RESHAPING THE
INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM 344 (Jean E. Kalicki & Anna JoubinBret eds., 2015)
U.N. CONF. ON TRADE & DEV., WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2013, 107 (2013) [Hereinafter WIR13].
U.N. CONF. ON TRADE & DEV., WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2017, 111 (2017) [Hereinafter WIR17].
Id.
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agreements provide for some form of ISDS, and of those that have an
ISDS provision, almost all of them provide for investor-State arbitration.23 It is investor-State arbitration that is the poster child for the pitfalls of ISDS.
There are three generations of IIAs. The first generation IIAs have
broad, sweeping language with “little interpretive guidance.”24 This
generation comprises the system’s “era of infancy” from the end of
WWII to the mid-1960s and its “era of dichotomy” from the mid-1960s
to late 1980s.25 The second generation IIAs span the mid-1990s to
about 2007.26 The first and second generation IIAs make up 95 percent
of all the IIAs that exist, and of that 95 percent, most are from the 1990s
where about three treaties were concluded every week.27 The third generation, the “era of re-orientation,” includes those IIAs concluded after
2008,28 which have tighter language that remedies the amorphous nature of the language in the first generation IIAs.29
Ingredient Quality: Character
By the mid-1990s, the number of ISDS cases brought before investor-state arbitration tribunals began to proliferate, and by 2014, the
number of cases had exploded.30 At the end of 2016, the known number
of cases climbed to 767, and of those cases, “[i]nvestors won 60 percent of all cases decided on the merits.”31 There were only 292 cases
from the 1950s to the end of 2007, and that number more than doubled
by the end of 2014.32 Although the year-over-year figures for ISDS
results appears to favor States, they must still fund their defense even
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

Coe, supra note 3, at 1339; Stephen L. Magiera, International Investment Agreements
and Investor-State Disputes: A Review and Evaluation for Indonesia, ERIA Discussion
Paper Series 1 (Jan. 2017), http://www.eria.org/ERIA-DP-2016-30.pdf.
Jonathan Ketecheson, Investment Arbitration: Learning from Experience, in SHIFTING
PARADIGMS IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 97, 117 (Steffen Hindelang & Markus
Krajewski eds., 2016).
WIR15, supra note 12, at 121-22.
Id.
WIR17, supra note 21, at 127.
WIR15, supra note 12, at 124-25.
Steffan Hindelang & Markus Krajewski, Conclusion and Outlook to SHIFTING
PARADIGMS IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 377, 377-78 (Steffen Hindelang &
Markus Krajewski eds., 2016).
WIR15, supra note 12, at 124.
WIR17, supra note 21, at 114.
WIR15, supra note 12, at 121.
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when they win.33 The first generation IIAs are the most problematic.
“[A]bout two thirds of investment arbitrations in 2016 were brought
under BITs, most of them dating back to the 1980s and 1990s.”34
IIAs usually have a 10 to 20 year term which either renews for an
additional term or turns into a case where one party may terminate the
agreement unilaterally.35 Most IIAs have survival clauses that provide
investor protections for a fixed period, usually between 10 and 15
years, but occasionally as long as 20 years.36 “Typically, such clauses
cover governmental measures adopted both before and after the date
of termination . . . but apply only to investments made before the
treaty’s termination.”37 These “sunset provisions”38 can come back and
“bite” States who unilaterally or bilaterally terminate their IIAs.39 “Occasionally, the provision in question even extends protection to all or
at least certain types of existing investors indefinitely throughout the
whole period of investment[,]” and some even cover “commitments to
invest.”40 Before terminating the old agreements, the United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) recommends that
States enter into new agreements using “transition clauses.”41 These
clauses “effectively modify the operation of the survival clause in the
‘outgoing’ treaty” by “clarifying that upon the new treaty’s entry into
force, the old treaty is phased out.”42

33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

Id.
WIR13, supra note 20, at 111; WIR15, supra note 12, at 146; WIR17, supra note 21,
at 116-17.
U.N. Conf. on Trade & Dev. Phase 2 of IIA Reform: Modernizing the Existing Stock of
Old-Generation Treaties, 2 IIA ISSUES NOTE 1, 3 (2017), http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/diaepcb2017d3_en.pdf. [hereinafter Phase 2 Reform]
Id. at 9.
Id.
Karsten Nowrot, Termination and Renegotiation of International Investment Agreements, in SHIFTING PARADIGMS IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 227, 242 (Steffen
Hindelang & Markus Krajewski eds., 2016).
WIR17, supra note 21, at 127.
Nowrot, supra note 38, at 243.
Phase 2 Reform, supra note 35, at 9.
Id.
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Ingredient Purpose: Function
The International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) handles most ISDS cases.43 The procedural rules outlined in the ICSID Convention or the ICSID Additional Facility Rules
govern ICSD cases.44 Other cases are handled at additional arbitral institutions and administered under the procedural rules outlined by the
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law
(UNCITRAL).45
ISDS cases are adjudicated with ad hoc tribunals consisting of a
panel of three arbitrators.46 Two arbitrators are party-appointed, and
each party picks their own arbitrator.47 The third arbitrator, as the presiding arbitrator, is the most important.48 Under the ICSID Rules, the
third arbitrator is agreed upon between the parties, and under
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, the presiding arbitrator is chosen by
the two party-appointed arbitrators.49 Because the third arbitrator is
least likely to hold any bias, “the role of a third presiding arbitrator is
critical to ensuring the integrity of the arbitral process.”50 As can be
imagined, it may not be easy for two sides to agree on a presiding arbitrator, and in such cases, one is picked for them.51
43.

Eberhardt & Olivet, supra note 4, at 14; See WIR13, supra note 20, at 111; U.N. CONF.
WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2016, 104 (2016) [hereinafter WIR16];
WIR17, supra note 21, at 115.
Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of
Other States, Oct. 14, 1966, 17 U.S.T. 1270, Art. 25(1) [hereinafter ICSID Convention]
(The ICSID Convention is the Washington Convention on the Settlement of Investment
Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States, which is also known as the
ICSID Convention or Washington Convention. Cases administered under the ICSID
Rules are for cases between Member States and nationals of other Member States to the
ICSID Convention); International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes,
ICSID Additional Facility Rules, https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/icsiddocs
/ICSID-Additional-Facility-Rules.aspx (last visited Jan. 3, 2018) (“Arbitration or conciliation of investment disputes between a State and a foreign national, one of which is
not an ICSID Member State or a national of an ICSID Member State.”).
David Gaukrodger & Kathryn Gordon, Investor-State Dispute Settlement: A Scoping
Paper for the Investment Policy Community, 3 OECD WORKING PAPERS ON INT’L INV.
1, 21 (2012), http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5k46b1r85j6f-en [hereinafter OECD WORKING
PAPER].
Id. at 88.
Id.
Id. at 89.
Id.
Ketecheson, supra note 24, at 106.
OECD WORKING PAPER, supra note 45, at 89.
ON TRADE & DEV.,

44.

45.

46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
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Awards are enforceable either under the ICSID Convention or the
New York Convention.52 Under the ICSID Convention, awards are automatically enforceable within States that are party to the ICSID Convention.53 Under the New York Convention, the prevailing party must
seek out an enforcement action in a New York Convention Member
State.54 States may challenge the enforceability of the award if the circumstances meet certain criteria.55
Under the current system, there is no way to appeal an arbitral
award because “[r]eview of ISDS awards depends on the forum in
which the dispute was initially brought and is almost always on narrow
grounds that exclude review for errors of law.”56 If the arbitration was
conducted under ICSID Rules or ICSID Additional Facility Rules, the
party unhappy with the decision may seek an annulment.57 The grounds
for an annulment are governed by the ICSID Convention and are limited.58 Alternatively, a party may seek a set aside under the New York
Convention at the seat of the arbitral award.59
Because “[o]ne perceived advantage of arbitration [was] confidentiality[,]” ISDS proceedings were confidential for most of their history.60 Maintaining such confidentiality when “public interest” is impacted, “presents difficulties[,]” and improvements to transparency
began “on an ad hoc basis.”61 As more awards entered the public realm,
52.

53.

54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

59.
60.
61.

Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, Jun. 10,
1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter New York Convention] (ensuring
that arbitral awards issued in one State may be enforced in other States that are also
party to the New York Convention.).
U.N. Conf. on Trade & Dev., Denunciation of the ICSID Convention and BITs: Impact
on Investor-State Claims, 2 IIA ISSUES NOTE 1, 2-3 (2010) [hereinafter Denunciation];
Stephen M. Schwebel, A BIT About ICSID, 23 ICSID REV. 1, 4 (2008) (quoting
RUDOLPH DOLZER & CHRISTOPH SCHREUER, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT
LAW 20 (2008)).
Susan D. Franck, The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Privatizing
Public International Law Through Inconsistent Decisions, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1521,
1551 (2005).
New York Convention, supra note 52, at Art. V.
OECD WORKING PAPER, supra note 45, at 1.
ICSID Convention, supra note 44, at Art. 52(1).
Id. (The grounds listed are: “the Tribunal was not properly constituted,” “the Tribunal
manifestly exceeded its powers,” one of the Tribunal members was corrupt, “a serious
departure from a fundamental rule of procedure,” or “the award has failed to state the
reasons on which it is based.”).
New York Convention, supra note 52, at Art. V.
Ketecheson, supra note 24, at 111.
Id.
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it became apparent there was a need for transparency.62 ICSID addressed transparency by requiring, at a minimum, the case summary
and publication of the full award if the parties agree.63 UNCITRAL
took larger strides by issuing the 2014 Transparency Rules that apply
to treaties concluded after 2014.64 It made further progress with passage of the Mauritius Convention, which, at a State’s option, would
apply to treaties that entered into force before 2014.65
The Rotten Meal: History & Context
The Salvageable Ingredients
ISDS has noble roots. The system was created to fill a hole in international law that needed to be addressed, and its “arbitration entitlement is one of the most progressive developments in the procedure of
international law of the last fifty years.”66 Before ISDS, foreign investors were limited to two options: (1) bring their case before plausibly
biased, ineffective, or non-existent domestic legal avenues; or (2) petition their State of origin to take up the case on their behalf.67 If the
State of origin provided diplomatic protection, it had no obligation toward the investor of any kind, and “the investor lo[st] control of its
claim.”68 Even worse, if a State were to recover damages, it had no
obligation to forward that money on to the “injured investor.”69
Foreign investors could not bring international actions against
host States because only States can bring actions against States.70 As a
result, investors had to rely on their home State to bring an action “on
their behalf at the International Court of Justice.”71 Indeed, the fact that
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

Coe, supra note 3, at 1355-56; Kaj Hobér, Investment Treaty Arbitration and its Future—if Any, 7 Y.B. ON ARB. & MEDIATION 58, 64 (2016).
Ketecheson, supra note 24, at 112.
Id.
Id.
Stephen M. Schwebel, A BIT About ICSID, 23 ICSID REV. 1, 4 (2008).
OECD WORKING PAPER, supra note 45, at 9.
Christoph Schreuer, Do We Need Investment Arbitration?, in 4 RESHAPING THE
INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM 879, 883 (Jean E. Kalicki & Anna
Joubin-Bret eds., 2015).
Ketecheson, supra note 24, at 102.
Daniel Kalderimis, Back to the Future: Contemplating a Return to the Exhaustion Rule,
in 4 RESHAPING THE INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM 310, 343 (Jean E.
Kalicki & Anna Joubin-Bret eds., 2015).
Franck, supra note 54, at 1536.
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ISDS creates standing for individuals against States is “one of the main
advantages of international investment law, as it depoliticizes potential
disputes between investors and host States.”72 ISDS created a mechanism whereby foreign investors could have their issue adjudicated before a neutral panel adhering to the rule of law—at least that is how it
was supposed to work in theory.73
When ISDS was created, there was a distinct “North/South” divide in the world economies.74 It was investors in developed countries
seeking to protect their investments in countries with judicial systems
that functioned poorly, if at all.75 Some argue that it was the rich imposing their will on the poor,76 but it is a rational motivation—why
would one invest in a country if the investment were subject to arbitrary seizure or unstable governance?77 Given the lack of protection
offered by insufficient domestic remedies and fickle diplomatic protection from one’s home State, it was necessary to have strong protections and a remedy for wronged investors.78 The problem, however,
was that the first generation’s IIAs, with their “broad and vague

72.
73.
74.

75.
76.

77.

78.

Omar E. García-Bolívar, Permanent Investment Tribunals: The Momentum is Building
Up, in 4 RESHAPING THE INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM 394, 394 (Jean
E. Kalicki & Anna Joubin-Bret eds., 2015).
OECD WORKING PAPER, supra note 45, at 10.
Schwebel, supra note 66, at 2-4 (This north/south divide describes the tension between
the needs of the developed countries in the northern hemisphere and the developing
countries in the southern hemisphere. The needs conflicted, and because the developed
countries brought the money, they drafted the agreements and developing countries capitulated to the will of the developed countries.). It is also interesting to note that the
majority of ISDS cases are brought against countries with “developing and transition
economies.” U.N. CONF. ON TRADE & DEV., WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2014, 146
(2014).
Schwebel, supra note 66, at 6.
See, Stephan W. Schill & Heather L. Bray, The Brave New (American) World of International Investment Law: Substantive Investment Protection Standards in Mega-Regionals, 5 BRIT. J. AM. LEGAL STUD. 419, 443 (2016) (“the substantive standards of protection in the agreements were formulated with the protection of investors from
developed countries in mind (but not necessarily the other way around)”).
Luis Miguel Velarde Saffer & Amir Ardelan Farhadi, Lessons from the Deathbed of the
Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP): Are Recent Critiques of the Investor-State Dispute
Settlement (ISDS) System Warranted?, 11 NO. 1 DISP. RESOL. INT’L 3, 10 (May 2017);
Schill & Bray, supra note 76, at 443.
Schwebel, supra note 66, at 3-4.

147

_GRENNESS_FORMATTED 10-26 (DO NOT DELETE)

2018

10/26/2018 11:44 AM

University of Baltimore School of Law

formulations,”79 left too much room for interpretation which often led
to results not foreseen when States entered into the agreements.80
As time progressed, the “South” modernized with advanced,
highly functioning domestic legal systems emerging.81 This created the
perception that a separate venue for foreign investors was no longer
necessary.82 While that may be true in the majority of cases, even in
countries where the domestic legal system is advanced, foreign investors may still not get a fair shake.83 In the infamous Loewen case, a
Canadian funeral home investor experienced an egregious miscarriage
of justice at the hands of a Mississippi jury with extreme bias against
outsiders.84 Indeed, when interviewed, the jury foreman stated proudly
that a “rich, dumb Canadian politician” could not “pull the wool over
the eyes of a good ole Mississippi boy.”85 Clearly, there is enough concern about bias at the domestic level in all judicial systems that ISDS
is warranted. A preference for a neutral international forum is “shared
by thousands” and is “a preference that is rationally and decently motivated.”86
The Foulest Ingredients
Sadly, somewhere along the line, ISDS went off track, and it now
has a distinct dark side that overshadows its noble roots. Entire books

79.
80.

81.
82.
83.
84.

85.
86.

WIR17, supra note 21, at 127.
David N. Cinotti, How Informed is Sovereign Consent to Investor-State Arbitration?,
30 Md. J. Int’l L. 105, 111-112 (2015); Ketecheson, supra note 24, at 98; Kalderimis,
supra note 70, at 330; Sean Woolfrey, The Emergence of a New Approach to Investment
Protection in South Africa, in SHIFTING PARADIGMS IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT
LAW 266, 269 (Steffen Hindelang & Markus Krajewski eds., 2016).
Schill & Bray, supra note 76, at 444.
Id. (“Mega-Regionals reflect a changed environment in which investment flows are no
longer unidirectional; instead they flow both ways. Treaties, in consequence, no longer
solely accommodate the offensive interests of capital-exporting countries[.]”).
Schwebel, supra note 66, at 6; Saffer & Farhadi, supra note 77, at 8.
See, O’Keefe v. Loewen Group, Inc., 1995 WL 778615 (Miss. Cir. 1995) ($500M jury
award for emotional distress) The $500M award was after the judge “reigned in” the
jury. Chris Hamby, A Homegrown Disaster, BUZZFEED NEWS, (Sept. 1, 2016, 5:57 AM),
https://www.buzzfeed.com/chrishamby/homegrown-disaster.
Chris Hamby, A Homegrown Disaster, BUZZFEED NEWS, (Sept. 1, 2016, 5:57 AM),
https://www.buzzfeed.com/chrishamby/homegrown-disaster.
Schwebel, supra note 66, at 6.
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are dedicated to the shortcomings of ISDS.87 At a high level, the following are major concerns.
Inconsistency
ISDS is notorious for inconsistent decisions. There can be cases
with similar facts, but a different outcome occurs under a single IIA
because of ad hoc tribunals composed of different members who review the facts of each case standing alone. Any prior decision from a
different tribunal on similar facts has no precedential weight. This
means that “while arbitral tribunals do consider each other’s opinions,
there is no guarantee that the reasoning or conclusions will be determinative in later cases.”88 There are many instances where “separate
tribunals have reached contradictory results that cannot be explained
by factual or legal differences.”89 Indeed, it could be argued “that the
institutional structure of ISDS with ad hoc panels composed of different arbitrators for each case is not designed to achieve consistency,
ha[s] not done so, and [is] not likely to do so in the foreseeable future.”90
There are also instances in which cases with almost identical facts
are brought under different IIAs, but the outcomes are different because the IIAs are different in substance. The phenomenon of two
cases brought under different IIAs is also called parallelism This is
where a single incident can give rise to claims “under two formally
different legal instruments.”91 In such a case, an investor may bring
separate claims for the same incident and receive two awards for the
single wrong action.
Arbitrator Bias
Arbitrators may have a vested interest in sustaining the current
system. As such, there is an economic bias in favor of investors—after
all, if there were no investors with an ISDS forum in which to bring
cases against States, arbitrators would be out of a job.92 Arbitrator rosters also reflect possible bias towards investors because “[g]overnment
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

See OECD WORKING PAPER, supra note 45, at 89; Franck, supra note 54, at 1521; Eberhardt & Olivet, supra note 4.
Franck, supra note 54, at 1611.
Eun Young Park, Appellate Review in Investor-State Arbitration, in 4 RESHAPING THE
INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM 443, 444 (Jean E. Kalicki & Anna
Joubin-Bret eds., 2015).
Gaukrodger & Gordon, supra note 11, at 608.
WIR13, supra note 20, at 106.
Gaukrodger & Gordon, supra note 11, at 606.
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backgrounds are less represented[,]” and “[l]awyers in private practice
dominate the field, constituting over 60% of ICSID investment arbitrators.”93 Furthermore, arbitrators are not restricted to a single role,
and they are free to pursue other avenues of remuneration in the investment law field. As a result, most arbitrators serve a double and
sometimes triple role as arbitrator, counsel, and expert witness.94 This
practice is criticized because “the process of arbitrators’ appointments”
leads to the “interchangeable role[s] of some arbitrators—sometimes
advocates, sometimes adjudicators.”95
The conflict is compounded because each of the parties select their
own arbitrator. This means that “[o]nce selected, an arbitrator’s personal incentive is to secure reemployment by providing his or her party
with a favorable outcome.”96 This is underscored by the fact that
“[n]early all dissents are written in favor of the party which appointed
that arbitrator.”97 Moreover, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) reported in 2011 that “a group of only
12 arbitrators have been involved . . . in 60% of a large sample of
ICSID cases[.]”98 With such an amazingly small number of arbitrators
handling the majority of cases, the same issues are bound to come up
over and over again.99 Therefore, it is inevitable that arbitrators are going to face issue bias where there is “either a pre-existing view or a
conflicting interest in an issue in a case they are deciding.”100 As a result, “[i]nvestment arbitration is particularly vulnerable to issue conflicts because of the recurring legal issues under the same or similar
legal instruments.”101
Investors’ Bad Behavior
Investors will engage in “nationality planning” whereby they survey the IIA landscape and decide which IIAs provide the best
93.
94.
95.
96.

Id., at 604-05.
González García, supra note 10, at 431.
García-Bolívar, supra note 72, at 395.
Hans Smit, The Pernicious Institution of the Party-Appointed Arbitrator, 33 COLUMBIA
FDI PERSPECTIVES (2010), http://ccsi.columbia.edu/files/2014/01/FDI_33.pdf.
97. Ketecheson, supra note 24, at 106.
98. OECD WORKING PAPER, supra note 45, at 45.
99.
Gus Van Harten, The European Commission and UNCTAD Reform Agendas: Do They
Ensure Independence, Openness, and Fairness in Investor-State Arbitration?, in
SHIFTING PARADIGMS IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 128, 134 (Steffen Hindelang
& Markus Krajewski eds., 2016).
100. OECD WORKING PAPER, supra note 45, at 50.
101. Id.
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benefits—they go treaty shopping.102 Investors will then create shell
companies, or mailbox corporations, to establish the minimum contact
necessary within an IIA party State so that they can get the benefit of
a particular IIA should a dispute arise in the host country in which their
investment lies.103 Investors may also do this after disputes arise.104
This also provides investors an insurance policy so that if they were to
lose their ISDS claim and an arbitral tribunal awarded the State costs,
the State can only go after the corporate entity that is party to the dispute, namely, the shell corporation.105 Because shell corporations tend
to have “few assets,” States looking to enforce their costs award may
come up short.106
Investors will also engage in parallel claims and can obtain double
payouts. They can do this because there are so many IIAs in existence
and because the arbitral tribunals are convened on an ad hoc basis.
Through nationality planning, investors can have a single set of facts
and bring claims under different IIAs to separate tribunals.107 Each
claimant is a “national” for purposes of the relevant IIA while the respondent is the host country for both cases.108
The Unpalatable Result
With all the unpleasant outcomes of ISDS, it is not surprising that
countries are re-evaluating whether or not they wish to remain parties
to IIAs with an ISDS mechanism. It used to be rare for States to terminate their investment treaty obligations; however, “[a] number of

102. Treaty shopping is a tongue-in-cheek term used to describe the way in which multinational corporations strategically organize their business and form subsidiary corporations solely to gain benefits under a particular IIA.
103. Duncan Watson & Tom Brebner, Nationality Planning and Abuse of Process: A Coherent Framework, ICSID REVIEW 1, 1 (Jan. 2018), https://academic.oup.com/icsidreview/advance-article/doi/10.1093/icsidreview/six020/4817698.
104. For example, after Phillip Morris lost a case in Australia’s domestic courts challenging
a public health regulation, it created a subsidiary corporation, Phillip Morris Asia Limited, so that it could get the benefit of the Australia-Hong Kong BIT. Stockholm Chamber of Commerce, Philip Morris Asia Limited v. Australia, ISDS BLOG (May 26, 2016),
http://isdsblog.com/2016/05/26/philip-morris-asia-limited-v-australia/.
105. Gaukrodger & Gordon, supra note 11, at 602.
106. Id.
107. See, Franck, supra note 54, at 1558-68 (discussing the Lauder arbitration cases where
similar suits came out with different outcomes with similar facts).
108. Franck, supra note 54, at 1558-68.
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notifications of termination . . . have recently been given[,]”109 and the
number is on the rise.110 Despite exiting the treaties, most of those eschewed IIAs have survival clauses.111 Indeed, of the 1,966 BITs surveyed by the OECD in 2011, if the treaties were terminated when most
came up for renewal, “90% would still have some binding effect until
at least 2024.”112 As noted by UNCTAD, these first generation treaties
have a serious “bite” that can come back to haunt countries for up to
twenty years after termination.113
Nevertheless, ISDS serves its purpose and should not be eliminated. This seems counterintuitive, but the system functions—albeit
with some ugly results. Investors also are entitled to a neutral forum in
which to seek redress of their grievances. This is particularly necessary
in jurisdictions where the judicial system is either undeveloped or ineffective. The issue becomes how to make it a fair forum for all stakeholders, and “[c]riticisms of ISDS should translate into proposals to
improve the system rather than to cast it aside.”114 It is unwise for States
to shed off the crux of ISDS in a reactionary manner without having
examined all the implications of terminating their IIAs or exiting the
ICSID Convention.115 States need to review not just the impact ISDS
has on their regulatory scheme;116 they also need to examine closely
the downstream effects of exiting the ISDS system.117
The Soufflé: Selective Reform
The Recipe: Substantive Reform
To reform the ISDS regime, the rotten ingredients must be emptied out and the bowl washed out. This means shedding the first and
second generation IIAs. UNCTAD identifies this as “phase two” of

109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

Gaukrodger & Gordon, supra note 11, at 611.
Nowrot, supra note 38, at 229.
Denunciation, supra note 53, at 3.
Gaukrodger & Gordon, supra note 11, at 612.
WIR17, supra note 21, at 127-29 & 132.
Saffer & Farhadi, supra note 77, at 20.
See Denunciation, supra note 53.
See Woolfrey, supra note 80, at 272-276 (South Africa examined the effect ISDS had
on its policymaking, but there is no indication it reviewed the impact withdrawing from
its BITs would have).
117. Denunciation, supra note 53, at 6.
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reform.118 The system is already entering phase two as language of new
IIAs is modernized to close loopholes and clarify meanings and then
phase out the old treaties.119 States have also taken strides to increase
transparency at the institutional level with the UNCITRAL Transparency Rules and Mauritius Convention, which both introduce requirements that awards and documents from proceedings be made public.120
Ingredients: The Terms121
The new IIAs’ substantive measures need to address old-school
IIA provisions where foreign investors have brought the most abusive
ISDS claims. It is also under these old-school provisions where foreign
investors have been most successful.122 For substantive treaty reform
to be effective, it is imperative that the old treaties be eliminated. The
following elements for replacement IIAs will prevent the most egregious ISDS abuses:
a. Most Favored Nation (MFN). Expressly limiting usage of the
IIA to nationals of treaty parties ensures that only foreign investors
who are nationals of the party States may take advantage of the treaty
provisions. This would preclude nationals from third-party countries
from free-riding on the IIA.123 When third-party national investors
free-ride on IIAs, it expands a State’s potential exposure to ISDS actions, which creates huge expenses in both potential liabilities payable
in public funds as well as the cost to defend unaccounted for investors’
claims.124
b. Fair and Equitable Treatment (FET). The FET provision has
proven particularly distasteful in its results in ISDS. In fact, of the
cases brought to ISDS in 2016 where the States lost, the FET standard
was found to be one of the most frequent breaches.125 To avoid the
118. WIR17, supra note 21, at 126.
119. Phase 2 Reform, supra note 35.
120. Ketecheson, supra note 24, at 112 (“The most recent significant initiative has been
adoption of the Rules on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration . . . by
UNCITRAL in July 2013.” And remainder of discussion regarding Mauritius Convention mitigating the limitations of the UNCITRAL Transparency Rules).
121. For a more in-depth look at the possible ingredients available, refer to Schill & Bray,
supra note 76, at 429-40.
122. Gaukrodger & Gordon, supra note 11, at 609 (reflective loss claims “substantial”
amount of cases); WIR17, supra note 21, at 117 (FET standard one of the most frequent
claims under which States found at fault).
123. WIR15, supra note 12, at 138.
124. Hsu, supra note 13, at 227.
125. WIR17, supra note 21, at 117.
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results seen to date with the tricky FET standard, States can narrow the
scope of these provisions to specify that the term means no more than
the minimum treatment standard to which nations are already bound
under customary international law.126
c. Shareholder Reflective Loss Claims. Awards for reflective loss
claims should be prohibited via express terms in IIAs. Currently,
“[c]laims by company shareholders seeking damages from governments for so-called ‘reflective loss’ now make up a substantial part of
the ISDS caseload.”127 Reflective loss is where shareholders may bring
individual claims for losses to the value of their shares in a corporation.
In most developed legal systems, reflective loss claims are prohibited.128 By contrast, “ISDS tribunals have found shareholder claims for
reflective loss to be autonomous from claims by the company.”129 This
means that the investing corporation and any of its shareholders may
all bring their own claims against a State in ISDS. It is essential that
States include such a prohibition to protect themselves from an extraordinary exposure to potentially huge liabilities to multiple parties for a
single act.
d. Narrow Definitions. States should eliminate “shares” and “derivatives” from the “investment” definition.130 In addition, the definition of “investor” should exclude individual shareholders who can currently bring their own, separate claims on an investor corporation’s
behalf when “the value of shares drops and/or dividends are reduced.”131 In the definitions, the most protective provisions should go
to those investors with the biggest stakehold in the host country.132 Narrow definitions would also prevent treaty shopping and nationality
planning for corporate citizenship.
126. Karen L. Kizer & Jeremy K. Sharpe, Reform of Investor-State Dispute Settlement, in 4
RESHAPING THE INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM 172, 176 (Jean E. Kalicki & Anna Joubin-Bret eds., 2015).
127. Gaukrodger & Gordon, supra note 11, at 609.
128. Id.
129. Gaukrodger & Gordon, supra note 11, at 609-10.
130. Id., at 609 (Tribunals allow shareholders access to ISDS because “shares” is part of the
definition of “investment.”); Chris Hamby, supra note 85 (Eliminating “derivative”
from the definition of “investment” would prevent a situation like happened with Sri
Lanka when the oil market plummeted when the economic bubble burst, and a bank
sued the country in ISDS over “risky oil derivatives,” and it sought and received damages that were “24 times greater than the amount of money it would have lost.”).
131. Id.
132. Hsu, supra note 13, at 228.
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e. Establish Interpretive Bodies. Interpretive bodies may issue
binding interpretations of treaty provisions that arbitral tribunals will
be obliged to follow. To protect investors with pending cases, there
could be a blackout period during which the interpretive body may not
issue a decision on a matter currently pending before an arbitral tribunal.133 An interpretive body would safeguard against arbitrators interpreting treaties in an expansive manner inconsistent with the way
States interpreted the provision when they signed the agreement.134 Just
as the United States Congress has a say in how courts interpret its laws,
States should have a say in the meaning assigned to terms of the agreements into which they entered with other State parties.135 It is not the
job of the judicial arm to make the law; rather, it is to interpret the law.
United States federal courts are guided in their interpretations of the
meaning in statutes by legislative history and records of the debates
held when the laws were considered in both houses of Congress. Similarly, arbitral tribunals deciding cases with terms established by one
of the disputants “should give great deference” to the meaning the State
parties assigned to those terms.136
f. Counterclaims & Investor Obligations. States can strategically
create a mechanism whereby investors can themselves be bound under
the terms of IIAs into which their home States enter. This would be
achieved through a two-pronged approach that each State party to the
IIA would have to follow: (1) “promulgate domestic laws of incorporation stipulating that by incorporating in that State, an investor gives
his consent to arbitration” in accordance with the relevant IIA; and (2)
in the text of the IIA, “stipulate that an ‘investor’ for the purposes of
the protection means that the enterprise has complied with laws of incorporation in its home State.”137 Such an approach would allow States
to hold corporations accountable to substantive obligations such as

133. See Tomoko Ishikawa, Keeping Interpretation in Investment Treaty Arbitration ‘on
Track’: The Role of State Parties, in 4 RESHAPING THE INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTE
SETTLEMENT SYSTEM 115, 139-48 (Jean E. Kalicki & Anna Joubin-Bret, eds. 2015).
134. Schill & Bray, supra note 76, at 439.
135. Saffer & Farhadi, supra note 77, at 16.
136. Ketecheson, supra note 24, at 114.
137. Elizabeth Boomer, Rethinking Rights and Responsibilities in Investor-State Dispute
Settlement: Some Model International Investment Agreement Provisions, in 4
RESHAPING THE INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM 183, 199 (Jean E. Kalicki & Anna Joubin-Bret eds., 2015).
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adherence to environmental and human rights standards.138 To date,
only one counterclaim has made it beyond the first phase of ISDS,139
but where there is one, there are more to come, and this is particularly
the case if more treaties contain such a provision.140
Recipe Preparation: The Strategy
After shedding the old agreements, instead of entering into a
whole new set of IIAs, States should coordinate their efforts and enter
into what have become known as “megaregionals.”141 Megaregionals
are FTAs with investment chapters that include multiple State parties
and cover larger swaths of the global economy. The best example of
this is the now defunct Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). Representing
40 percent of the world’s trade,142 the TPP’s investment chapter was
reform focused. Out of the eighteen IIAs concluded in 2016, the TPP
was one of only two IIAs that hit all eleven categories of UNCTAD’s
“reform-oriented provisions.”143
Even if megaregional FTAs cannot be worked out, because of the
“narrow scope” of the discussion, megaregional investment agreements would be more likely to succeed in those cases.144 Until recently,
there were few multilateral investment agreements.145 As one commentator put it, “as compared to the number of Multilateral Investment
Agreements (‘MIAs’) . . . what one observes is that the ‘MIAs’ are
‘missing in action.’”146 With the advent of megaregional investment
agreements (which one could also call MIAs) the MIAs are no longer
“MIA.”

138. Id. at 201.
139. WIR13, supra note 20, at 111.
140. See Saffer & Farhadi, supra note 77, at 17-18 (discussing the TPP’s counterclaims provision, which was “likely a response to previous decisions that have excluded counterclaims under the ICSID Convention[.]”).
141. U.N. CONF. ON TRADE & DEV., WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2014, xxiii-xxv (2014)
[hereinafter WIR14].
142. USTR,
https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/fact-sheets/2011/february/engagement-trans-pacific-partnership-increase-export (last visited Jan. 4, 2018).
143. WIR17, supra note 21, at 119-23 (2017) (Table III.3 on page 121 and surrounding discussion on pages 119-123).
144. Constain, supra note 19, at 350.
145. WIR14, supra note 141, at xxiii-xxv.
146. J.J. Saulino & Josh Kallmer, The Emperor Has No Clothes: A Critique of the Debate
Over Reform of the ISDS System, in 4 RESHAPING THE INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTE
SETTLEMENT SYSTEM 560, 563 (Jean E. Kalicki & Anna Joubin-Bret eds., 2015).
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The Tools: Institutional/Procedural Reform
We need only beat the eggs in this soufflé to the point of soft
peaks, so selecting the tool to achieve this result is very important.
There are three sorts of reform focused dispute resolution mechanisms
that should be administered through ISDS institutions: (1) alternative
dispute resolution (ADR), which includes mediation and conciliation;
(2) an arbitral appellate mechanism; and (3) a standing investment
court. Which reform works best will depend on the character of the
recipe at the time it is made. Currently, ISDS reform is still in its late
adolescence; a gentle touch may not be enough to produce the change
necessary, while a firm hand may be counterproductive to obtaining an
ideal outcome.
Mix by Hand: Alternative Dispute Resolution
There is “burgeoning” scholarship on the suitability of ADR
methods in the ISDS realm.147 Another matter of debate is whether
ADR should be mandatory or if it is even suitable to ISDS where there
is a “public-private conflict” at stake.148 When an investor does not
want to annihilate a relationship with the host State in an adversarial
process that can take years and absorb massive amounts of money,
ADR may be an attractive option.149 Although it is underutilized, the
ICSID Convention has a conciliation provision which “provides an important opportunity to reach a settlement without having the dispute
become truly litigious.”150
While ADR is absolutely a good option at the domestic level, it
poses significant challenges at the international level. The parties may
come to an agreement, but it is unclear whether such agreements may
be enforced if one of the parties were to renege.151 In addition, even
though ADR is very cost effective at the domestic level, it may not be
cost effective in the ISDS sphere.152 The costs in investor-State
147. Hsu, supra note 13, at 230 (“In the ISDS context, the question of whether a shift toward
such non-adversarial means is possible forms the focus of now-burgeoning academic
and practitioner literature.”).
148. Id., at 234, 242.
149. Id., at 230.
150. Id., at 231.
151. Id., at 243.
152. Given the length of time and costs involved in investor-State arbitration, adding a required ADR layer adds more time and expense to the process. See Hsu, supra note 13,
at 239 (discussing the criticisms levied against the ICSID conciliation procedures currently in place).
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arbitration are jaw dropping. Unless ADR is truly a lower cost option
where agreements are enforceable, disputants are unlikely to go the
ADR route.153 Furthermore, where ADR is made mandatory, it may
simply delay the process and increase costs as the parties simply go
through the motions to comply with the letter of the IIA law.154
“[R]eplacing it with mandatory alternative dispute resolution mechanisms . . . may result in increasing the perception of political risk and
making foreign investment more costly because it would relegate dispute settlement to untested alternatives.”155 Investor-State arbitration
may not be ideal, but it is the known quantity, and adding major
changes via a different dispute resolution paradigm to a system that is
in crisis is not advisable.
Electric Beater: Arbitral Appellate Mechanism
The current system allows for a second look at prior awards
through ICSID, but it is not an appellate mechanism per se, and it is
only available in extreme cases.156 By utilizing a randomly appointed
panel of arbitrators, an arbitral appellate mechanism would do much to
improve the current system without a complete overhaul.157 Instituting
such a measure makes sense through ICSID because there is already a
procedure for annulling awards. As such, modifying the ICSID Convention to allow for a closer review of cases would be easier than creating a whole new institution. Modification would need to expand reviewing tribunals’ authority to review the facts de novo, if warranted,
as well as review for errors of law.158 The appellate tribunal should be
able to take partial action so that it is not an all-or-nothing review
where either the whole award is upheld or it is entirely overturned.159
153. Hsu, supra note 13, at 243.
154. See Hsu, supra note 13, at 238 (discussing measures to use in mandatory mediation that
would avoid litigants participating in ADR “as a matter of ‘lip service’ or to delay resolution of the dispute”).
155. Stephan W. Schill, The Sixth Path: Reforming Investment Law from Within, in 4
RESHAPING THE INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM 621, 627 (Jean E. Kalicki & Anna Joubin-Bret eds., 2015).
156. Park, supra note 89, at 444.
157. Joerg Weber & Catharine Titi, UNCTAD’s Roadmap for IIA Reform of Investment Dispute Settlement, 21 N.Z. BUS. L. Q. 319, 321 (Dec. 2015).
158. Gabriel Bottini, Reform of the Investor-State Arbitration Regime: The Appeal Proposal,
in 4 RESHAPING THE INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM 455, 460-61 (Jean
E. Kalicki & Anna Joubin-Bret eds., 2015).
159. Jaemin Lee, Introduction of an Appellate Review Mechanism for International Investment Disputes: Expected Benefits and Remaining Tasks, in 4 RESHAPING THE INVESTOR-
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“Alarms have been raised” because first level decisions impact
public policy and have “expansive political and economic consequences,” which means questionable awards should be subjected to a
searching review as a means of “quality control.”160 The arbitrators selected in appellate cases should also be randomly appointed from “a
fixed body or roster” so as to remove the bias inherent in party appointed arbitration.161 Appellate review proposals have been floating
around since 2002 with the passage of the U.S. Trade Act,162 which
“mandated a negotiating objective” for inclusion of appellate mechanisms in all future IIAs where the U.S. was a party.163 Treaty-by-treaty
establishments of appeals mechanisms, however, are inefficient, and
“it would be more desirable to create a single, institutionally managed
appeals mechanism to prevent further fragmentation in the system.”164
Furthermore, ICSID sought public comment on an appellate
mechanism proposal in 2004 but did not receive much feedback, and
the idea was “shelved.”165 There are now billions of dollars at stake, so
as more States become party to ISDS suits, and as more of them reach
the point where they are considering exiting the ISDS system entirely,
such an appellate proposal should reach more “fertile ground” than it
has in the past.166 In light of the fact that States are unlikely to upset
the apple cart too much,167 a mechanism that builds on the current system even with “at least some contribution . . . would have a considerable chance of, over time, making investment arbitration more

160.
161.
162.

163.
164.
165.
166.
167.

STATE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM 474, 492-93 (Jean E. Kalicki & Anna Joubin-Bret
eds., 2015).
Park, supra note 89, at 451.
Id.
The main function of the U.S. Trade Act 2002 was to provide the President with fasttrack authority in negotiating trade agreements. It established that Congress could only
vote yes or no on agreements without authority to make any modifications. The Act also
sought to bring coherence to the international investment arena by requiring that future
trade agreements with investment chapters include in writing an objective to negotiate
the establishment of an appellate mechanism. THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 1155-1156 (Peter Muchlinski, Federico Ortino &
Christoph Schreuer eds., 2008) (discussing the aspect of the Act dedicated to appellate
mechanisms in international investment treaty law).
Park, supra note 89, at 451.
Id.
Schill, supra note 155, at 625.
Id.
González García, supra note 10, at 433.
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legitimate.”168 If an appellate mechanism were pursued alone, it would
not be enough. But because there are so many other ingredients that
can be added in, an appellate mechanism would have a huge impact
without an extreme overhaul, which States are less likely to do when
they typically “appear unwilling to embark on such reform projects.”169
Commercial Mixer: Standing Investment Court
The other option is a standing investment court. Recently, the European Union included an investment court system (ICS) proposal in
three FTAs it negotiated. The idea for “a court to settle investment disputes between States and foreign investors . . . is not new” and “can be
traced back to the period immediately after the conclusion of World
War II.”170 As ISDS became more controversial, calls to create a permanent international investment court reappeared in the early 2000s.171
The idea did not gain traction, but it was taken up anew in UNCTAD’s
2015 World Investment Report where a standing investment court was
listed as one of five reform paths.172 The EU proposal is a bold step in
ISDS reform and turns the current system on its head by adding another
layer of complexity to an already overly complex system. The ICS proposal leaves too many questions unanswered and creates serious questions about enforceability of awards,173 the role of international law
norms where references to them were left out of the text,174 and creates
an appellate mechanism with grounds for review that go only slightly

168. Bottini, supra note 158, at 465.
169. Schill, supra note 155, at 625.
170. Eduardo Zuleta, The Challenges of Creating a Standing International Investment
Court, in 4 RESHAPING THE INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM 403, 404
(Jean E. Kalicki & Anna Joubin-Bret eds., 2015).
171. Id. at 408, citing Gus Van Harten, A Case for an International Investment Court, Soc’y
of Int’l Econ. L., 2008.
172. U.N. Conf. on Trade and Dev., Reform of Investor-State Dispute Settlement: In Search
of a Roadmap, 2 IIA ISSUES NOTE 1, 4 (Jun. 2013); WIR15, supra note 12, at 28 (The
five reform paths proffered include: “1. Promoting alternative dispute resolution[;] 2.
Tailoring the existing system through individual IIAs[;] 3. Limiting investor access to
ISDS[;] 4. Introducing an appeals facility[; and] 5. Creating a standing international investment court.”); WIR15, supra note 12, at 152.
173. See AMERICAN BAR ASS’N SECTION OF INT’L L., INVESTMENT COURT SYSTEM PROPOSAL
INITIAL TASK FORCE DISCUSSION PAPER 98-114 (Oct. 14, 2016), http://apps.americanbar.org/webupload/commupload/IC730000/newsletterpubs/ExecutiveSummaryDiscussionPaper101416.pdf
[hereinafter A.B.A. WORKING PAPER] (in-depth discussion on the enforcement issues).
174. Id., at 55 & 58.
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further than the ones currently available under the ICSID Convention.175
The proposal is a reactionary response to political pressures to
eliminate a flawed system.176 A task force from the Investment Treaty
Working Group of the A.B.A. section of International Law’s International Arbitration Committee produced an extensive evaluation of the
EU’s ICS Proposal. The task force concluded that the ICS proposal
contained procedures that were “inchoate and often, incoherent.”177
The task force noted that “many details of the Investment Court appear
to not have been fully considered,” which underscores the reactionary
nature of the proposal.178 Moreover, the task force recommended the
proposal be “carefully considered before its implementation,” and it
ended by stating that “[r]eplacing a workable arbitration system with
an unworkable Investment Court must be avoided.”179
An investment court created at the individual treaty level is also
ill advised where the system already suffers from too many layers of
complexity. For an investment court to work, it would have to be created at an institutional level through a multilateral effort because “institution building is not simply an exercise on paper.”180 An investment
court would be like creating another ICSID because the existing institutions are “ill-adapted” and “antithetical” to a multilateral investment
court.181 Until the strands in the “complex spaghetti bowl” of IIAs are
straightened out and the portion reduced, an investment court would
merely reinvent the wheel.182 Even more, with all its unanswered questions, implementing an investment court like that proffered in the EU
Proposal could bring the system back to this point in the future. With
the Proposal’s vague language and its reactionary promulgation, who
is checking the back door to ensure no goblins ride in on the Proposal’s
175. Id., at 76-77.
176. European Commission Press Release IP/15/3201, Report Presented Today: Consultation on Investment Protection in EU-US Trade Talks (Jan. 13, 2015) (The Commission
received almost 150,000 comments, and they were overwhelmingly against ISDS).;
A.B.A. WORKING PAPER, supra note 173, at 6.
177. A.B.A. WORKING PAPER, supra note 173, at 135.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Ketecheson, supra note 24, at 127.
181. A.B.A. WORKING PAPER, supra note 173, at 9 (discussing a whole new institution better
suited to administering judicially decided ISDS disputes).
182. WIR13, supra note 20, at 106-7.
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coat tails like they did with the broad, sweeping language of the first
generation IIAs?
While an investment court is a noble option and one that would
surely make great strides in legitimizing the system, for it to be a viable
solution, it must be carefully thought out, well crafted, and all stakeholders consulted in its creation.183 UNCTAD and the OECD have already taken steps in this regard.184 With the current system, there is
enough experience with the familiar that everyone can at least agree
on the precise aspects of the system that need work.185 One must remember that the first generation BITs and ICSID were all endeavors
with pure—or at least rational—intent. Now, look at the mess at hand.
As the aphorism goes, the road to hell is paved with good intentions;
therefore, a measured approach to overhaul of the ISDS regime is warranted.
Chef’s Tip
The appellate mechanism is viable enough that it would be better
to put ADR and a standing investment court back on the shelf, pending
the outcome of an appellate mechanism. ADR should be pursued if the
number of ISDS cases continues to rise after megaregional IIAs take
effect and first and second generation IIAs eliminated. A standing investment court is so radical a change that it would require creation of
a whole new institution suitable for managing a judicial approach.186 A
standing investment court is therefore best put aside, and it should only
be pulled out if the strength of its force is necessary to bring the best
out of the recipe. For now, this recipe is best served by an appellate
mechanism utilizing the arbitral tribunal model.
The Place Setting: Normative Reform
ISDS has a tremendous normative effect in public international
law. The fact that it has been incoherent and inconsistent at times is
extremely concerning. According to Stephan Schill, arbitral tribunals
“contribute significantly to making international investment law and
act as a mechanism of global governance.”187 Therefore, “all those
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.

A.B.A. WORKING PAPER, supra note 173, at 9-10.
Id. at 120.
Ketecheson, supra note 24, at 120.
A.B.A. WORKING PAPER, supra note 173, at 120.
Schill, supra note 155, at 623.
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affected by investment arbitration’s governance activity” are entitled
to an explanation that justifies the system.188 According to Schill, ISDS
“will continue to face challenges and criticism[,]” and its survival will
depend on States’ acceptance “of how investment treaties are interpreted and applied.”189 Most important, “investor-State arbitration has
to deliver on the promise of an accountability mechanism to implement
the rule of law[.]”190
Schill argues that investor-State arbitration “can be reformed . . .
by arbitrators and parties making increasing use of comparative public
law methodology that allows them to draw on the experience of more
sophisticated systems of public law adjudication at the national and
international level[.]”191 Accordingly, both investor-State arbitration
and international investment law as a whole should be reframed under
a “public law paradigm.”192 This “requires rethinking arbitration not so
much as a dispute settlement mechanism, but as a mechanism of global
governance; understanding arbitrators not so much as agents of the parties, but as trustees of the international community[.]”193 As a result,
“[p]ublic law instead of private law rationales should then guide the
practice of investor-State arbitration.”194
The Place Mat: Restatements
To bring public law rationale to the forefront, an international interpretive body with inclusive membership would be invaluable to creating a system that provides input from all those affected by ISDS.
Such a body should “benefit[] from regular participation by ICSID and
UNCTAD, input from leading experts in relevant fields, and the views
of arbitration specialists, business and civil society.”195 This panel
would mirror that of a panel created in an individual IIA. Schill emphasized, however, that even in a case where individual IIAs include
interpretive bodies that issue binding opinions on what the wording

188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.

Id.
Id. at 633-34
Id.
Id. at 627.
Schill, supra note 155, at 639.
Id.
Id.
Gaukrodger & Gordon, supra note 11, at 598 (an interpretive body should be like that
made up by the OECD’s Freedom of Investment (FOI) Roundtable, which examines
issues in international investment law).
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means, that it “will go only so far in reducing arbitrator discretion; it
can never exclude it completely.”196
An international interpretive panel of members examining international investment law could be one like that for the International Law
Commission.197 Such a commission “would not be very different from
what many scholars and eminent practitioners do at the moment”
where they issue interpretations of international law and describe
trends in issues of public international law.198 The International Law
Commission is an extremely influential body to the development of
public international law.199 This is so despite the fact that there are no
precedential effects in international law and interpretations issued by
the Commission are merely persuasive authority.200 An international
investment law commission could hold similar weight, especially if it
were “created by the United Nations General Assembly[,]” and its
work would be a “somewhat soft-control mechanism” in which its
opinions “would not be binding on arbitral tribunals[.]”201 Although “it
would be for each tribunal to decide what weight to give to these reports[,]” the reports would “have a considerable effect on the progressive development of international investment law.”202
If international investment law were to have such “an expert
body” with “eminent international lawyers from different jurisdictions[,]” they could “reconcil[e] divergent opinions and bring[] about
a general understanding concerning the rules” for international investment law.203 An international investment law commission would
“identify and analyze conflicting approaches to investment protections[.]”204 In particular, because such a body would be created under
the auspices of the UN General Assembly, States would have a role in
the appointment of the members. As such, States can take advantage
of such a panel “at a broad[] international level” and “communicate

196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.

Schill, supra note 155, at 626.
González García, supra note 10, at 435.
Id.
Id. at 436.
United Nations, About the Commission, INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION (Jul. 31,
2017), http://legal.un.org/ilc/ilcintro.shtml.
González García, supra note 10, at 436.
Id.
Id. at 435.
Id.
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their views about how treaties should be interpreted.”205 This would be
accomplished via “restatement-type documents. These could help arbitral panels and other users to better understand government intent in
crafting various elements of investment treaties, thereby helping to
eliminate inconsistencies[]” in defining the meaning and standards in
the IIAs that make up international investment law.206 Indeed, “[d]etermining international standards, by definition, involves recourse to
comparative law.”207
The Ramekin: A Code of Ethics that Bites
To achieve the comparative public law viewpoint, expectations
for treaty interpretation need to be made mandatory and explicit, which
should be done at the institutional level to be most effective.208 In addition, the expectations on acceptable conduct must be made explicit
with a significant slap on the wrist in the event the code of conduct
were violated. A code of conduct of this sort should apply to both arbitrators and counsel. Sanctions could be issued both for unethical arbitrator actions as well as counsel who bring unmeritorious or abusive
ISDS cases.209
An institution with a function such as that served by Bar associations with binding authority would be a good option. Such an institution would have the power to “disbar” international investment lawyers and serve an educational function for practitioners. It would do
this by ensuring practitioners have the necessary understanding of the
relevant public international law and not just treaty and corporate law.
This sort of institution could also require continuing education credits
so that practitioners are aware of trends in the law. As a result, even if
there is little “interest among practitioners” for reform of the system,
they must still be responsible for understanding such reform is required
of them.210 Indeed, if the “attitude of indifference” is not changed, “no
205.
206.
207.
208.

Gaukrodger & Gordon, supra note 11, at 608.
Id.
Schill, supra note 155, at 644.
See Id., at 646 (discussing the argument from observers that such mechanisms be “coercive.” While Schill concludes that such mandatory institutionalized expectations are
unnecessary, this comment takes the position that they are necessary—at least in the
beginning.).
209. See Sam McMullan, Holding Counsel to Account in International Arbitration, 24
LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 491, 508-510 (no. 2, 2011) (discussing international arbitral tribunals
levying sanctions against unscrupulous counsel).
210. González García, supra note 10, at 425.
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sensible reform will be achieved.”211 Again, such a governing instrument would need to be a collaborative effort. Either each State would
have its own ethics code and managing authority or a multilateral institution such as ICSID or UNCITRAL would supervise it. In any
event, authority to issue sanctions for violations would be essential.
When the only sources of ethical codes are from varying origins and
none are binding, it “can lead to a situation where not everybody knows
what they are supposed to do and how to behave.”212
The Utensils: Impartial Decision Makers
It is time to “detach[] adjudicators from the disputing parties” and
“establish[] a roster of arbitrators, randomly selected, by lot, for each
individual case they are called to hear.”213 It is essential, however, that
decision makers be selected “through a transparent process that involves consideration of the interests of relevant stakeholders (including investors).”214 This could involve more than just selection of top
tier arbitrators already on the ICSID and UNCITRAL lists. Instead,
adjudicators can be taught to become truly impartial decision makers.
For example, to improve the functioning of its federal court system,
the United States has a Judiciary agency that manages the training of
court personnel, including judges.215 ISDS could benefit from such a
program, and if implemented via the ICSID Convention or
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, most arbitrators and the cases they
touch could be reached.
Another ISDS issue is that the current pool of arbitrators is “pale,
male and stale”216 because the majority are from North American or
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.

Id.
Id. at 435.
Weber & Titi, supra note 157, at 321.
A.B.A. WORKING PAPER, supra note 173, at 132.
The Judiciary agency is the Federal Judicial Center which was established by 28 U.S.C.
§ 620. According to § 620(b)(3), one of the functions of the Court is “to stimulate, create, develop, and conduct programs of continuing education and training for personnel
of the judicial branch of the Government and other persons whose participation in such
programs would improve the operation of the judicial branch, including, but not limited
to, judges, United States magistrate judges, clerks of court, probation officers, and persons serving as mediators and arbitrators.”
216. Pale, male, and stale is a tongue-in-cheek phrase heard at many different conferences
but not one this author has seen in print in the literature about investor-State Arbitration.
It appears the phrase originated in a comment referencing the composition of NASA in
1992. What is the Origin of ‘Pale, Male and Stale’?, ENGLISH LANGUAGE & USAGE (Jul.
18, 2014), https://english.stackexchange.com/questions/185731/what-is-the-origin-ofpale-male-and-stale.
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European countries, over 95% are male, and the age range is very narrow with “elite members of the legal profession.”217 To promote diversity in membership and background/viewpoints as well as impartiality,
arbitrators can be taught to fulfill their mission with training in public
international law. If implemented at the multilateral institutional level,
States can have a role in shaping who decides the cases. Some of the
complaints levied against ISDS are that the pool of arbitrators need no
special qualifications or background,218 and few have training in public
international law.219
Instead of going in the opposite direction as advocated in the EU’s
ICS Proposal, which mandates a State-picked roster of decision makers, a middle ground may be found.220 Training arbitrators to think like
judges could also alleviate investor concerns that decision makers on
a roster would hold pro-State biases.221 Fears that they may lack the
necessary expertise to preside over complex areas of law in niche economic sectors would also be addressed.222 If arbitrators who specialize
in corporate law and various economic sectors are given judicial training to harness their expertise, and if they use it to interpret law rather
than “conflate technical legal analysis with political and economic policy choices,” there would be a tremendous step forward in alleviating
both public and private concerns about the persons who preside over
ISDS cases.223 After all, “meet[ing] the qualifications for judicial office does not, of itself, result in any guarantee that the candidates will
be qualified to decide investment disputes.”224 But most of all, “it is

217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.

Gaukrodger & Gordon, supra note 11, at 604.
González García, supra note 10, at 433.
OECD WORKING PAPER, supra note 45, at 91.
A.B.A. WORKING PAPER, supra 173, at 23.
Id., at 131.
See, e.g., Anne van Aaken, Delegating Interpretative Authority in Investment Treaties:
The Case of Joint Administrative Commissions, in 4 RESHAPING THE INVESTOR-STATE
DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM 39 (Jean E. Kalicki & Anna Joubin-Bret, eds. 2015) (discussion regarding tension between legal expertise and factual expertise. “Being an expert in the law does not mean that one is an expert on the factual situation which needs
to be decided upon. There are clearly always questions that need more factual expertise.”).
223. Liang-Ying Tan & Amal Bouchenaki, Limiting Investor Access to Investment Arbitration: A Solution without a Problem?, in 4 RESHAPING THE INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTE
SETTLEMENT SYSTEM 309 (Jean E. Kalicki & Anna Joubin-Bret eds., 2015).
224. A.B.A. WORKING PAPER, supra note 173, at 125.
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fundamental that justice should not only be done but should be seen to
be done.”225
Conclusion
If ISDS is to enter “responsible adulthood,”226 then States and
stakeholders must coordinate and thrust ISDS into its best self. It must
be a cohesive endeavor both in terms of the parties involved as well as
the elements incorporated into the solution. “[A]chieving more uniformity and consistency and a widely acceptable view on how investor
rights and public interests should be balanced requires consensusbuilding processes with a multilateral effect and appropriate methods
to reach that consensus.”227 If the approach is strategic and methodical
with a long-term solution always at the forefront, the “warts and all”
that mar the current ISDS complexion may be eliminated.228
Although multilateral solutions are extraordinarily difficult to
achieve,229 they would “go farthest in systemically improving investment dispute settlement.”230 More importantly, “comprehensive reform
would require taking into account not only existing IIAs that entail investment dispute resolution but also ISDS instruments, such as the
ICSID Convention and UNCITRAL’s Arbitration Rules.”231 Certainly
with regard to amending the ICSID Convention with an appellate
mechanism, even though it may be “notoriously difficult” and some
may say that because a prior attempt failed, “consensus will never be
found,” it is a new day in ISDS.232 Attitudes are changing as the costs
of ISDS awards mount into the tens of billions range.233 The reform
recipe for the ISDS regime requires a delicate balance. The regime is
engorged by carb loaded spaghetti, and it needs slimming down with a
high protein diet of the most impeccable quality. The solution must be
served surrounded by a theoretical approach suitable to the ISDS character, prepared by a tool best suited to the form of the current ISDS
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.

González García, supra note 10, at 433.
Constain, supra note 19, at 344-50.
Schill, supra note 155, at 649.
Saffer & Farhadi, supra note 77, at 21.
Kizer & Sharpe, supra note 126, at 174.
Weber & Titi, supra note 157, at 327.
Id.
A.B.A. WORKING PAPER, supra note 173, at 120.
WIR13, supra note 20, at 111 & n.66 ($1.77 billion award against Ecuador was the
largest award in history at that time.); WIR15, supra note 12, at 146 (The largest award
to date is now $40 billion.).
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recipe, and filled with ingredients that complement each other in a cohesive whole. It is time to toss out the rotten spaghetti and have soufflé
instead.
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